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Representative Bureaucracy, Street-Level 
Bureaucrats, and Bureaucratic Discretion 
in Federal Disaster Assistance 
 
 
Jason D. Rivera 
SUNY Buffalo State 
 
This paper explores the role of representative bureaucracy and bureaucratic discretion in 
the allocation of federal disaster assistance to Hurricane Sandy survivors.  Through the 
analysis of focus groups and key informant interviews, this study finds that FEMA home 
inspectors are not diverse in reference to race and gender; however, inspectors are found 
to be diverse in reference to place of origin.  Although the role that race and gender play 
in the allocation of resources is found to be unclear, the region from which inspectors come 
from is found to be influential in the allocation of aid to survivors.  As such, this research 
argues that the study of representative bureaucracy should not be limited to issues of race 
and gender, but be expanded to include other potentially important characteristics.  
 
Because federal disaster assistance has such a profound influence on communities’ ability 
to recovery from disasters within the United States, researchers have questioned whether there 
are individual characteristics amongst disaster assistance applicants that have an influence on 
whether they are granted aid by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
Generally, most disaster research indicates that lower-income and minority communities face 
greater challenges in recovering from disasters (Peacock et al. 1997; Bolin and Stanford 1998; 
Hewitt, 1995; Brunsma et al. 2010); however, there is little research that attempts to 
investigate how demographic characteristics of an individual disaster aid applicant influences 
disaster aid allocations (Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel 2004; Kousky 2013).  Although 
Loukaitou-Sideris and Kamel (2004) and Kousky (2013) attempt to observe the potential 
influence of race, they are limited by their inability to specifically measure the individual 
characteristics of FEMA applicants, which does not allow for full discussions of the potential 
issues associated with the equitable distribution of resources at the individual level. 
Even if individual demographic characteristics of applicants may influence the 
allocation of aid across different social groups within American society, observing the race 
or ethnicity of an applicant in relation to whether or not they received aid may not provide a 
true depiction of what is actually occurring.  Past research has pointed out that the main, if 
not only, person-to-person contact that disaster aid applicants have with FEMA occurs with 
home inspectors (McEntire et al. 2012).  As a result, home inspectors operate as FEMA’s 
street-level bureaucrats, representing the bureaucracy of FEMA to the public in addition to 
playing the role of gatekeeper to federal disaster recovery resources.  Although the damage 
assessments generated by these street-level bureaucrats are not totally deterministic of 
whether or not an individual is approved for aid, these bureaucrats have a great deal of 
influence due to their role in assessing the level of damage inflicted on a property, and 
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determining whether that damage is  covered by FEMA’s disaster assistance programs.  When 
these street-level bureaucrats are not representative of client communities, the influence of 
street-level bureaucratic discretion can have potentially detrimental effects on the recovery 
of minority populations.  Despite the potential relationship between the representativeness of 
FEMA street-level bureaucrats and individuals’ success in garnering assistance, no study 
exists to explore this relationship.   
As such, this research explores the influence FEMA home inspectors have on 
individuals’ success of acquiring federal disaster assistance by using the theories of 
representative bureaucracy and bureaucratic discretion as theoretical frameworks.  In the 
following sections, I first provide a brief discussion of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy, the role of street-level bureaucrats, and how bureaucratic discretion has been 
shown to influence the provision of public service programs among different groups within 
society.  I then provide a description of the context in which this study is situated, Hurricane 
Sandy.   Then through the analysis of focus groups and key informant interviews I investigate 
the representativeness of home inspectors and then the potential influence that this 
representation has on FEMA’s decision to approve an individual for assistance.  Finally, 
contributions to the theory of representative bureaucracy are presented to progress the theory 
not only in reference to disaster recovery, but also more broadly within the field of public 
administration. 
 
Representative Bureaucracy, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Discretion 
The theory of representative bureaucracy maintains that the powers of a bureaucracy 
can be made more responsive to the interests of the public if the personnel that staff 
administrative agencies reflect the demographic characteristics of client communities 
(Krislov 1974; Meier 1975; Thielemann and Stewart 1996; Meier et al. 1999; Sowa and 
Selden 2003).  The reason for this responsiveness to the public lies in the potential matching 
of values and beliefs between bureaucrats and respective clients that share demographic 
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and gender (Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981).  
According to Sowa and Selden (2003), these values and beliefs harbored by bureaucrats 
directly influences their behavior and discretion in the administration of public programs.  
The work of Seldon et al. (1998), Hindera (1993), Meier (1993), and Meier and Stewart 
(1991) all demonstrate that when minorities have access to positions within a bureaucracy 
there is a tendency within the respective bureaucracy to benefit minority clients.  However, 
the potential benefits of a representative bureaucracy have been more recently challenged by 
the devolution of administrative control between the national government and state, local, 
private and third-sector actors (Lieberman and Lapinski 2001), which is epitomized by the 
outsourcing of government services.  According to Keiser et al. (2004; McConnell 1966), the 
devolution of the state provides the potential for a loss of equity in the treatment of minorities 
participating and those seeking to participate in government programs.    
Despite the contributions that representative bureaucracy as a theory has made to 
understanding the dynamics of organizational behavior, the theory alone is not able to 
adequately explain the direct consequences of a representative bureaucracy in reference to 
government program service and/or resource provision because the theory does not explain 
the role of administrative discretion (Meier et al. 1999).  A number of studies have examined 
the impact of discretion on the provision of services by administrative agencies by studying 
the impact of discretion held by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980; Kelly 1994; Brodkin 
1997; Sandfort 2000).  Lipsky (1980, p. 3) defines street-level bureaucrats as “public service 
workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have 
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substantial discretion in the execution of their work.”  Examples of these workers include, 
but are not limited to teachers, police officers, welfare workers, health and safety inspectors, 
and other public employees who control access to public programs or enforce public laws and 
regulations (Meyers and Vorsanger 2003).  In most cases these types of individuals are 
responsible for the central activities of public agencies, which range from determining 
eligibility for a program to allocating benefits, judging compliance, imposing sanctions and 
exempting individuals and businesses from potential penalties (Meyers and Vorsanger 2003).  
What is problematic about this situation stems from the devolution of government and the 
subsequent lack of oversight of these individuals’ decisions on the behalf of government 
agencies.  According to Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000), even though street-level work 
is saturated by rules, the work itself if not rule bound.  Even the authority of a supervisor has 
little constraining influence over the decisions and actions of street-level workers.  As such, 
they not only deliver services, but also shape policy and program outcomes by interpreting 
and allocating resources to individuals within society (Lipsky 1980).   
The main defining characteristic of street-level workers is their direct contact and 
interaction with the public.  Unlike other government officials and politicians, street-level 
workers see clients as individuals: “as clients, students, criminals, suspects, victims, and so 
on” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000, p. 334).  As a result, Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno (2000) maintain that their interactions with clients are personal and emotional, and 
are rarely rational.  This characteristic contributes to potential behaviors among street-level 
workers that are inclined to disregard the specific nature of a case or the individual they are 
working with for other characteristics they think are more important. Moreover, this can and 
typically does result in street-level workers identifying those who are “worthy” of services or 
treatment beyond the routine, in addition to identifying individuals who they perceive to 
require extra scrutiny or some form or punishment (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003 and 
2012).  Subsequently, street-level workers act as “agents of social control” by forcing clients 
to conform to bureaucratic and majority social values and beliefs for the receipt of 
government services (Lipsky, 1980).  As a result, street-level workers may have a tendency 
to favor clients who resemble themselves and discriminate against those from different racial, 
social class, and/or cultural backgrounds (Lipsky, 1980; Keiser et al. 2004).   
As a byproduct of these past findings, this research specifically explores the potential 
relationship between the representativeness of FEMA street-level bureaucrats in reference to 
race and gender, and the influence that this dynamic has on an individual’s success of 
garnering aid from FEMA.  I hypothesize that when disaster applicants are racially different 
than their home inspectors, minority applicants will perceive the bureaucracy to be 
detrimentally biased against them.  Moreover, I hypothesize that when FEMA’s street-level 
bureaucrats are not representative of disaster assistance applicants, this will result in lower 
levels of benefits being bestowed to the applicant, even when assistance is granted.  However, 
before testing these potential relationships an understanding of this study’s context, the 
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, is important. 
 
Hurricane Sandy and New Jersey 
Sandy was tenth named hurricane during the 2012 hurricane season.  The storm 
initially developed in the southwest region of the Caribbean on October 22nd, and became a 
hurricane on October 24th.  Before making landfall, Sandy produced severe flooding along 
the Atlantic Coast from Florida to Maine as it moved north. The highest storm surges and 
greatest inundation on land occurred in the states of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut, 
especially along the coast of central and northern New Jersey, Staten Island, and the 
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southward-facing shores of Long Island. On the morning of October 29th, the storm’s 
trajectory shifted northeast toward southern New Jersey, and by that evening Sandy made 
landfall near Brigantine, New Jersey as a post-tropical cyclone with winds up to 80 miles per 
hour.  Sandy weakened as it moved west across southern Pennsylvania on October 30th, and 
by November 1st the wind and rains from the storm had diminished across the affected states.   
The damages inflicted on the New Jersey coast were unprecedented in the state’s 
history.  According to New Jersey’s governor Chris Christie, “I’ve called this experience New 
Jersey’s Katrina because the damage to our state is nothing that we’ve experienced ever 
before” (Office of the Governor 2012).  Although the entire state was affected, the most 
severe damage was sustained in Monmouth and Ocean Counties.  Entire communities in the 
state were “inundated with water and sand, houses were washed from their foundations, 
boardwalks were dismantled or destroyed, cars were tossed about, and boats were pushed 
well inland from the coast” (Blake et al. 2013, p. 17).  Power outages lasted for weeks in some 
New Jersey communities – in all affecting about 5 million residents.  As of February 2013, 
the state’s governor’s office had reported that 346,000 housing units had either been damaged 
or destroyed by Sandy, with 22,000 of those units being classified as uninhabitable.  In 
reference to the private sector, 19,000 businesses sustained damages of $250,000 or more, 
and total business losses were estimated at $8.3 billion.  In addition, Sandy ruptured natural 
gas lines, which caused fires in some areas contributing to the loss of housing units.  Power 
and gas line repairs were estimated to cost about $1 billion and repairs to waste, water and 
sewer services were estimated to cost another $3 billion.  Overall, the governor’s office 
estimated the cost of returning the state to normalcy to be upwards of $36.9 billion (Office of 
the Governor 2012).    
 
Methods 
The data for this study was generated within the context of a larger project that 
sought to investigate the equitable distribution of federal home assistance aid to Hurricane 
Sandy victims (Rivera 2016).  Data germane to the investigation of representative 
bureaucracy and potential bureaucratic discretion was collected through focus groups (Belzile 
and Öberg, 2012; Hacking, 1999; Kaplowitz et al., 2004; Marková et al., 2007; Morgan, 1997) 
and key informant interviews because these methods provided for the ability of the researcher 
to not only explore whether or not respondents perceived the FEMA bureaucracy to be 
diversified, but also how they perceived that level of diversity to influence their success of 
acquiring federal disaster assistance.  Moreover, because of the sensitive nature of the 
concepts of diversity and potential discrimination, focus groups allowed respondents to 
express themselves in their own language, as opposed to that of predetermined responses 
developed by the researcher (Wilkinson, 1998; Morgan, 2012).  As a result, the use of focus 
groups enhanced the face validity of data (Krueger 1988; Ryan et al. 2013).  
Focus group sampling occurred regionally: one for northern New Jersey and one for 
southern New Jersey.  To increase the probability of an individual being recruited that was 
affected by Hurricane Sandy, the sampling frame was confined to three municipalities in the 
north, Long Branch, Asbury Park and Ocean Township, and three municipalities in the south, 
Atlantic City, Brigantine and Pleasantville.  These cities were chosen because they are located 
on the coast, and they all experienced similar disaster affects, such as damages due to 
flooding, storm surge, and windshear. Because funding limited the number of focus groups, 
and subsequently the number of individuals that could participate, screening participants on 
the characteristic of filing a FEMA claim was needed to ensure that participants would have 
had some level of experience with the FEMA bureaucracy.  Moreover, this characteristic 
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ensured that participants had learned about FEMA assistance in some way, but the manner in 
which they gained the information was not important in the screening of participants.   
The focus groups were conducted around a number of key questions within a 
stimulus survey. This provided three benefits.  First, it allowed for the grouping of data within 
categories that were specific to the information of interest to the researcher for each respective 
survey question.  Second, by using a semi-structured approach within the focus groups, the 
researcher was able to direct the generation of data appropriate to each question in such a way 
that non-pertinent data or the discussion of topics not germane to a question were avoided.  
Third, it allowed for the testing of survey questions that would potentially be used in the final 
administered instrument.  Each focus group lasted approximately one and a half hours, 
everyone that started the focus group remained throughout the entire group meeting, and both 
focus groups were audio recorded for future transcription and analysis. Finally, a framework 
analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994) strategy was used to analyze the data generated by the 
focus groups.  Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics of participants in each of the two 
focus groups. 
 
Table 1: Description of Focus Groups Participants (N=16) 
Variable 
Frequency % of Sample 
Northern Southern Northern Southern 
Race 
White 1 3 10.0% 50.0% 
African American 9 3 90.0% 50.0% 
Age 
26 to 34 years old 0 1 0.0% 16.6% 
35 to 44 years old 1 1 10.0% 16.6% 
45 to 54 years old 2 1 20.0% 16.6% 
55 to 64 years old 2 2 20.0% 33.3% 
65+ Years Old 5 1 50.0% 16.6% 
Marital Status 
Married 6 3 60.0% 50.0% 
Single 1 2 10.0% 33.3.0% 
Divorced/Separated 2 1 20.0% 16.6.0% 
Refused 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
Children in Household 
0 6 4 60.0% 66.6% 
1 3 0 30.0% 0.0% 
2 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
4 0 1 0.0% 16.6% 
5 0 1 0.0% 16.6% 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 3 1 30.0% 16.6% 
On medical or disability leave 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
Employed full-time 5 5 50.0% 83.3% 
Refused 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
Educational Attainment 
Some high school 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
High school diploma 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
Some college, no degree 4 1 40.0% 16.6% 
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Associate’s degree 2 1 20.0% 16.6% 
Bachelor’s degree 1 2 10.0% 33.3% 
Master’s degree 0 2 0.0% 33.3% 
Refused 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
Household Income 
Less than $25,000 1 0 10.0% 0.0% 
$25,000 to $34,999 2 0 20.0% 0.0% 
$35,000 to $49,999 2 2 20.0% 33.3% 
$50,000 to $74,999 1 2 10.0% 33.3% 
$75,000 to $99,999 2 2 20.0% 33.3% 
$100,000 to $124,999 2 0 20.0% 0.0% 
Gender 
Male 6 4 60.0% 66.6% 
Female 4 2 40.0% 33.3% 
Country of Origin 
United States 10 5 100.0% 83.3% 
Other 0 1 0.0% 16.6% 
Primary Language 
English 10 6 100.0% 100.0% 
 
In the northern focus group, 90 percent of the participants were African American and 
only ten percent (one participant) were white.  This composition was completely unexpected 
based on the individuals that had previously confirmed attendance.  Additionally, in reference 
to the southern focus group, although sixteen individuals had confirmed attendance, only six 
actually participated in the focus group.  The southern focus group was more racially balanced 
than the northern group, with half the group self-identifying as African American and the 
other half self-identifying as white.   
In order to provide a more holistic understanding on representative bureaucracy and 
bureaucratic discretion in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, key informant interviews were 
attempted with various New Jersey county emergency manager coordinators, county level 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs), and nonprofit organizations 
mentioned by focus group participants (Philips, 2014). Interviews have been documented as 
being extremely useful in disaster research (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Phillips, 2014; Stallings, 
2007), especially for gaining access to respondents that are difficult to access through 
traditional surveying techniques.  Moreover, Phillips (2014) maintains that interviews offer 
an unobtrusive means of triangulating findings. In all, three county emergency management 
coordinators and two county VOAD coordinators participated in interviews.  Although 
representatives from Helping Hands and various county chapters of the United Way in New 
Jersey expressed interest in answering questions, these individuals never completed the 
questionnaire sent to them.  Attempts were made to recontact the representatives of these 
organizations through email and by phone, but they did not respond to secondary requests. 
The data generated from the interviews were analyzed using a framework analysis similar to 
the manner in which the focus group data were analyzed.   
 
Analysis 
 
Representativeness of Street-Level Bureaucrats 
In reference to assessing bureaucratic representation among FEMA home inspectors, 
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the participants in each focus group were asked several questions in order to observe whether 
or not inspectors were representative of their client communities. One issue that became 
apparent within the focus groups was that most of the participants within each of the focus 
groups had interacted with several home inspectors, not just one.  In some cases, participants 
had different opinions for each of the inspectors that they had experiences with.  As such the 
analysis of participants’ responses to these themes highlights this phenomenon.   
 Two questions that sought to observe aspects of representative bureaucracy among 
FEMA home inspectors did so in reference to the perceived racial/ethnic background of the 
inspector relative to a respective participant and whether or not the inspector was able to 
effectively speak the primary language of the respective participant.  In reference to the latter 
question, all of the participants in both groups indicated that all of the inspectors that they had 
personally interacted with spoke their respective primary language, English.  Although it 
seems that, as far as the participants in the focus groups were concerned, FEMA inspectors 
were representative of their clients in reference to client language efficiency; there was no 
variation within the sample of participants’ use of another language as their primary mode of 
communication.  Therefore, this observation should be taken skeptically because it may not 
represent the experiences of other FEMA assistance applicants that use English as a secondary 
language, especially when one observes the presence of non-English speaking households in 
the participants’ communities as reported by the Census.1   
Alternatively, key informant interviews provided a different picture.  According to 
one VOAD county coordinator, although home inspectors were not diverse, “they seemed 
able to get translators as needed.”  Moreover, the ability to utilize translators was also 
highlighted by county emergency management coordinators.  One coordinator stated that 
within his jurisdiction “we did learn of a communication issue in a local community in which 
a particular neighborhood spoke Portuguese.  As a result, FEMA was asked to bring in 
interpreters and develop handouts in this language, which they did, and we were able to get 
residents what they needed.”   Based on these observations, it can be inferred that inspectors 
may not be linguistically representative of their client communities; however, when this poses 
a complication to service provision inspectors do attempt to find translators to facilitate more 
effective service provision, which focus group participants would not have been exposed to 
due to their proficiency with English.   
 When asked to report whether participants perceived the inspectors that came to their 
homes were of the same racial/ethnic background as themselves, all of the participants 
overwhelming indicated that almost all of the inspectors were white.  Only one participant 
reported that although several different inspectors had come to his home over the course of 
eighteen months, only one was not white.  In this instance, he reported that the inspector was 
Hispanic/Latino; however, according to the participant, 
 
I mean, you really couldn’t tell he was Hispanic.  The only reason I knew was 
because when he introduced himself his name sounded Hispanic.  He didn’t have an 
accent or anything really and he was really as fair [skinned] as I am. 
 
                                                          
1  For the northern focus group, Asbury Park and Long Branch, New Jersey have 30.7 
percent and 41.2 percent, respectively, of their populations that speak a language other than 
English at home.  In the southern focus group, for Brigantine and Atlantic City, New Jersey 
these proportions are respectively 13.9 percent and 41.8 percent. 
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It is also interesting to note that when participants were asked this question, the white 
participants in the southern focus group seemed very hesitant to provide an oral response.  
One asked, “Why is that even relevant”, while the others shook their head in a confirming 
way.  This was very different from the African Americans’ responses in both groups.  In both 
focus groups, the African American participants were very quick to respond that, “No”, the 
inspectors were not of the same racial background as themselves.  This dynamic was mirrored 
by key informant interviews with county VOAD coordinators.  Although the interviewees did 
not expand upon their perceptions, they did state that “The FEMA inspectors were not 
[racially] diverse...” Finally, it should be pointed out, that when attempting to triangulate 
these findings with county emergency management coordinators, each of the interviewees 
were either reluctant to discuss the issue of home inspector racial/ethnic diversity or they 
indicated they simply “don’t have much contact with any home inspectors” to provide an 
objective assessment.   
  Another question raised for discussion sought to observe representation of FEMA 
home inspectors in reference to gender.  Participants were asked whether the inspector that 
came to their homes were the same gender as themselves.  As previously mentioned, most of 
the participants had several inspectors come to their homes for various reasons; however, in 
all but one case, the inspectors that came to the participants’ homes were all male.  
Interestingly, the only case in which an inspector was reported as being female came from a 
female participant living in Brigantine.  
 
Well, I thought it was strange [that the inspector was a woman], just because I just 
expected the inspector to be a man for some reason.  But, she was away from her 
children.  She was away from her family.  She – I mean, I had – thought we 
connected.  We talked about Thanksgiving dinner.   
 
Although no one else reported a female inspector coming to their home, this does not 
necessarily indicate that this was necessarily an exceptional case.  County VOAD 
coordinators also indicated that there was a lack of gender diversity amongst inspectors; 
however, this perception was a byproduct of their general experiences with inspectors and not 
necessarily in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Specifically, VOAD coordinators could not 
recall whether or not home inspectors were diverse in reference to gender in the aftermath of 
Sandy when serving New Jersey residents.   
Finally, many of the participants raised an interesting observation about all of their 
inspectors.  In no case had any of the inspectors that participants interacted with originated 
from New Jersey.  Participants indicated that all of their inspectors were from various states 
across the country.  Not all of the participants could remember where their respective 
inspectors came from; however, they were all able to report that they were “from out of the 
area.”  Some places that the participants could remember their respective inspectors coming 
from included, but were not limited to, Arizona, California, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Oklahoma.  As a result, many of the participants indicated that their respective 
inspectors had told them that it was the first time that they had had the opportunity to 
inspected home damages that resulted from a hurricane.  Moreover, one participant succinctly 
described the issues associated with out of state inspectors that all of the participants agreed 
was the case for them as well. 
 
…they [the inspectors] were from out of the area.  So they had no concept of the cost 
involved to do the [repair and reconstruction] work in this area.  I think my guy was 
8
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 23, No. 2 [2016], Art. 2
http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol23/iss2/2
Rivera Bureaucracy in Federal Disaster Assistance 
 
- 11 - 
from Oklahoma, but he was looking at what the cost was in the Midwest not New 
Jersey, where maybe a sheet of sheetrock is $10 less out there.  I mean, I don’t know, 
where labor is probably cheaper too, because you’re not dealing with any unions or 
any of that.  So they were off – and like he came back with a total cost of $55,000 
to renovate my house, to do everything.  That was no appliances or anything else.  
So I had a local adjustor come and look at my house, and asked him what he thought 
the same renovations that the other guy said would cost a certain amount would cost 
according to him.  The local adjustor came up with $125,000, just to do everything 
that needed to be done on the house [the structure], and that was with no electrical 
or appliances or anything else.   
 
Interactions with Street-Level Bureaucrats and Bureaucratic Discretion 
 
 In order to observe the perceived impacts of representative bureaucracy on an 
individual’s success of being approved for aid, participants were asked whether or not they 
believed that they were treated fairly by their respective home inspectors.  One reaction to 
this question was the general sentiment that they just were not sure.  For example, one white 
woman from the southern cohort said, 
 
I think at that point [when the inspector actually showed up] I was not prepared for 
the inspector, and I was just not knowledgeable enough to know what was 
happening.  I think that’s the truth.  I think at that point I was more worried about 
nice or not nice, okay, I guess they’re – I’m assuming they’re doing their job.  I’m 
assuming their doing their job. 
 
In the northern cohort, more than half of the participants said that they did not know whether 
or not they were treated fairly.  One African American woman summarized all of their 
feelings of ignorance by saying, 
 
No, he [the inspector] was very polite and mannerable, but I don’t know, since I 
didn’t know what they were looking for, I don’t know whether it was fair or unfair… 
 
According to the participants, their lack of knowledge about the FEMA inspection process 
did not allow them to make a truthfully accurate assessment of the fairness of their inspectors.  
However, this was not the case for everyone. 
 The other general reaction to this fairness question was negative.  Perceptions of 
unfairness were most prominent in the northern focus group.  Interestingly, in both focus 
groups, the individuals that perceived the inspectors to be unfair were African American.  One 
African American woman summed up most of their experiences by stating, 
 
I think he was unfair.  I don’t even think he explained to me.  He identified who he 
was.  He did not explain the process, although I had known the process, because I 
had spoken to – the hearsay…I really honestly could say that I don’t think my 
inspector cared.  I think he – it was just a job that came up on his phone and he went 
to it… 
 
As indicated previously, some participants said that although they had come in contact with 
some inspectors that they perceived to be unfair, because several different inspectors came to 
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their home they did not want to make blanket statements about all of them.  In these cases, 
the participants did not necessarily attribute differences in damage assessments to an 
underlying issue of fairness, but a lack of standardized competence across all of the 
inspectors.  Many of the participants in the northern focus group spoke about the fairness of 
different inspectors in relation to the FEMA assistance they received and the assistance that 
others in their neighborhood did not receive with similar damages to their home.  One African 
American male participant in the northern focus group said,  
 
I got some money for my damages, but my neighbors that got the other guy didn’t 
get nothing. They basically had the same damage as I did, but didn’t get no money.  
So they [my neighbors] called FEMA back and requested that the inspector I had 
come back out and speak to them because they were treated totally different…[T]he 
guy I had really explained the process to me.  And I think I was lucky in that he 
explained what was going to happen.   
 
Although participants viewed these differences among their neighbors as unfair, they were 
also wary of directly saying that the individual inspectors were intentionally unfair or whether 
the perception of unfair practices was a product of a lack of training and knowledge about the 
process among different inspectors.   
 Lastly, participants were directly asked whether they had felt that the 
inspector/inspectors they had had contact with discriminated against them in some way.  The 
members of the northern focus group emphasized issues of perceived racial discrimination 
within the FEMA assistance application process.  Moreover, the notion of discrimination was 
only prevalent in the minds of African American participants.  White focus group participants 
did not feel that they had been discriminated against in any way, and even thought the 
researcher’s questioning was leading and bias.  Notions of discrimination were most prevalent 
within the discussions of the northern focus group; however, there were two reactions to the 
question on discrimination.  The first was that participants did not feel that their inspectors 
were discriminatory, but rather they were emphatic that FEMA as an organization was.  One 
female African American participant in the northern focus group said,  
 
I felt the inspector was fair.  I think FEMA was unfair, and even racist.  I’m not 
going to blame him [the inspector] for what FEMA didn’t do.   
 
Additionally, one male African American participant in the southern focus group recounted, 
  
 
My inspector was fair, even if he was a little cold.  But, at the end of the process was 
a guy that calls me up from Austin, Texas for FEMA.  I know this because he pissed 
me off and I didn’t appreciate the conversation… He then asked me what my race 
was, and some other things, which really pissed me off! And I’m like, “Sir, this is 
really – I think this is unfair. And you might be in Texas and this flood is not 
affecting you, but I am in New Jersey, and this flood is affecting me.  And currently 
I am homeless.  We are kind of like counting on this…So in order to make a long 
story short, he hung up on me.  Within I’d say about three hours, he disapproved me.  
It was FEMA, or whoever was working for or with FEMA that treated me like that, 
not the inspector.  Again, I’ll give credit where credit is due, but I’m not the one that 
really has high regard for FEMA.   
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The other reaction to the question of discrimination was less direct.  Although many 
of the participants were supportive of the statement that they felt FEMA as an organization 
was discriminatory, they were unsure where FEMA as an organization’s discrimination 
started and ended in relation to the inspectors.  For example, one African American woman 
in the northern focus group stated, 
 
… that’s the thing, the inspector goes and he observed, he assesses everything, but 
he has to bring that information back to FEMA, so he has a big part to do with what 
FEMA is going to give you.  So it goes hand in hand in my eyes. If the inspector is 
racist then you’re not gonna get anything.   
 
One discussion between three other African American participants further highlighted the 
potential effect of bureaucratic discretion: 
 
Not to cut you off, but I think that they [the inspectors] have a lot of say in what 
they’re really reporting, because he can say, oh, this is not, they’re not going to pay 
for this, and they’re not going to cover this and they’ll cover that.  He is the person 
that’s going to give FEMA all the information.   
 
What he does is write up a report on what he sees. 
 
I felt like – I don’t think – he doesn’t have to necessarily write it down at all.  
 
Exactly! He can tell you he’ll report everything he sees, and then go to the car and 
be like, “She won’t get shit.” So yeah, you get the decision from FEMA, but in reality 
it was the inspector that made the unofficial decision when they met you.  I mean I 
can’t prove that they were racist [the inspector], but they hold the keys to the 
kingdom.  They tell FEMA what you should get and what you shouldn’t get.  FEMA 
just processes the information whether it’s biased or not, they [FEMA the 
organization] doesn’t care either way.   
 
Yeah, the government does that stuff with welfare.  You talk to a person who says 
you qualify for this or that based on what they see or what is reported to them and 
they make a decision based on whether they think you should personally get it.  If 
they do it for that, why not this? 
 
Despite the lack of consensus among focus groups in reference to notions of 
discrimination and fairness, there was a notable difference in the way African Americans and 
Whites responded to these types of questions.  Because of the lack of discussion among white 
participants, it was unclear to what extent issues of representation within FEMA’s 
bureaucracy may have influenced FEMA’s decision on their respective assistance 
applications.  For African American participants this was not entirely the case.  Among 
African American responses there was an expressed concern not only with general notions of 
bureaucratic discretion among home inspectors, but also for the potential of individual racist 
sentiments held by inspectors to influence how inspectors report what they observe to FEMA.  
Although participants generally avoided labeling their inspectors as biased, all of the 
participants did acknowledge that the states from which their respective inspectors originated 
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may have had a significant impact on the way damages were assessed and reported to FEMA, 
which could have subsequently affected the success of their applications.  Specifically, 
variation in the level of knowledge among inspectors in reference to how to assess damages 
and what damages they believed FEMA would cover was perceived to vary by their state of 
origin, which fostered perceptions of incompetence and a lack of training that was viewed to 
be detrimental to the success of individuals’ respective success of being approved for aid. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Through the analysis of focus groups and key informant interviews, the racial and 
gender representativeness of FEMA street-level bureaucrats, home inspectors, was explored.  
Based on the analyses, this research finds that there is a perception by both disaster aid 
applicants and individuals/organizations that work with FEMA in disaster recovery activities, 
that FEMA’s street-level bureaucrats (home inspectors) are not diverse in reference to race 
nor gender. Along these lines, none of the African American focus group participants had 
interacted with a FEMA home inspector that was not perceived to be White, and only one 
participant indicated that one of their home inspectors was a woman.  Moreover, it was also 
found through the key informant interviews that although these bureaucrats are also not 
linguistically diverse, FEMA has the ability to compensate for this limitation when the 
situation requires.  
 Related to the notion of representativeness of FEMA’s bureaucracy is the potential 
influence that this representation has on the provision of services and the allocation of disaster 
assistance among Hurricane Sandy victims.  Although the key informant interviews were not 
helpful in understanding this potential relationship, the focus groups were instrumental.  
Based on the focus group analysis, differences between how white and African American 
participants perceived they were treated by FEMA street-level bureaucrats were apparent.  
Whites perceived that they were either unsure whether they were treated fairly by home 
inspectors based on their own ignorance of the inspection process, or that they did not 
perceive to be treated unfairly by home inspectors.  Although some African Americans also 
indicated that they were unsure whether they were treated unfairly because of their lack of 
knowledge about the inspection process, several indicated that their experiences with 
FEMA’s street-level bureaucrats was unfair.  Moreover, some African American participants 
even spoke about the potential influence that home inspectors’ bureaucratic discretion could 
possibly play in their ability to garner disaster recovery resources from FEMA.  Additionally, 
some African Americans even drew a distinction between FEMA’s street-level bureaucrats 
and FEMA as a larger organization by indicating that their inspectors were not necessarily 
problematic, but FEMA as larger organization was bias against them in their pursuit of 
acquiring disaster recovery assistance. 
 As a result of these findings, I find some evidence to support my first hypothesis that 
when street-level bureaucrats are not representative of their clients that negative perceptions 
of the bureaucracy manifest.  Moreover, although I also find some partial support for my 
second hypothesis that when FEMA’s street-level bureaucrats are not representative of 
disaster assistance applicants, this will result in lower levels of benefits being bestowed to the 
applicant, even when assistance is granted, the data in support of this is surprising.  The reason 
the support for this finding is surprising is because focus group participants did not necessarily 
attribute their varying level of aid to the racial or gender diversity of FEMA’s street-level 
bureaucrats and the potential role that this might play in program benefits as explained by the 
theory of representative bureaucracy with its current mainstream focus on issues of racial and 
gender diversity.  Instead, focus group participants attributed their varying levels of aid to the 
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geographic representativeness of their inspectors, which not only affected their perceptions 
of how inspectors interacted with them, but also the way in which an applicant’s property was 
assessed and subsequently approved for a certain amount of assistance.   
This finding appears to be consistent with other studies that find a relationship 
between the regions from which bureaucrats originate and how that geographic origin 
influences the bureaucrat’s ideological orientation towards various groups, which 
subsequently affects the bureaucrat’s personal discretion in matters of policy choice and 
implementation (Keiser and Soss 1998; Keiser 1999; Soss and Keiser 2006; Bradbury and 
Kellough 2008; Grissom et al. 2009).  However, despite the fact that the influence of region 
has been found to be important, especially among African American bureaucrats, these 
studies have been confined to the legislative context, how issues of racial diversity within 
schools affect student achievement, and/or the administration of welfare services.  Although 
these studies help to provide instruction on how region may affect bureaucratic discretion in 
public program service provision, the role this variable plays in other venues, such as disaster 
recovery has yet to be sufficiently explored. This is extremely problematic considering the 
continued public statements that occur in the aftermath of disasters throughout the United 
States that center around allegations of discrimination in the disaster recovery process. 
However, some may argue that geographic representativeness within a bureaucracy 
and its influence on program service provision or the bestowment of resources is better 
explained by notions of the “hollow state” rather than by the theory of representative 
bureaucracy.  For example, government outsourcing in general, but in particular emergency 
management, results in reductions of oversight, accountability and transparency, which is 
problematic when dealing with disaster-affective populations because not only is the speed 
and volume of service delivery is important, but also the quality and cultural appropriateness 
(Handmer, 2000; Kirschenbaum, 2004; Roberts, 2010; Rademacher, 2011).  However, 
Grissom et al. (2009) maintain that not only does the regional origin and context of a 
bureaucrat potentially influence the salience of race in decision-making, but also, in the case 
of home inspectors, their experience with working in different disaster contexts.  Although 
most contemporary studies of representative bureaucracy tend to focus on race and gender, 
limiting analyses to these two characteristics may be providing an incomplete image of how 
diversity within bureaucracies and/or other policy making entities influences service 
provision (Kennedy, 2014).  As such, future research in the realm of representative 
bureaucracy should not only expand the scope of what characteristics are important to having 
a representative bureaucracy, but also return to succinctly answering the question – How do 
we narrowly define representative bureaucracy? By doing this, not only will we be able to 
better measure representativeness because we will be able to better identify its presence or 
absence in governmental organizations, but we can also better evaluate the importance of 
representative bureaucracy in public program provision in contrast to the issues posed by the 
hollowing of the state. 
 
Jason D. Rivera is an assistant professor of public administration within the department of 
political science at SUNY Buffalo State.  Jason’s research interests include disaster response 
and recovery among low-income and minority communities with an emphasis on governance 
structures and bureaucratic organizations. 
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